Typology and Financial Performance of Champagne Makers According to Distribution Channel by Declerck, Francis
© 2005 International Food and Agribusiness Management Association (IAMA). All rights reserved.  1
 
International Food and Agribusiness Management Review 
Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
 
Typology and Financial Performance of Champagne Makers 
According to Distribution Channel 
 
Francis Declerck aL  
 
a Associate Professor, Finance Department; and Researcher, International Agri-Food Management 






A typology of strategies related to the distribution channels used by Champagne 
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Introduction 
 
In 1992, during the economic recession in Western Europe and North America, 
consumers were unwilling to pay a high price for a bottle of Champagne, but 
the grapes used to produce that wine had been harvested 3 years earlier and 
purchased at a very high price. In 1991 and 1992, only 214 million bottles were 
sold compared to the 149 million bottles sold in 1989. Squeezed between high 
costs and low retail prices, Champagne makers had to sell Champagne in 
supermarkets at a lower price than usual. A few years later, after the boom in 
1999 that saw sales reach 327 million bottles, economic stagnation returned. 
Sales dropped to 269 million bottles in 2001, 288 million bottles in 2002 and 
293 million bottles in 2003, as shown in tables 1 and 2. The Champagne 
business was worth 3.4 billion euros in 2003. This paper shows how 
Champagne makers - called “Maisons de Champagne” - have learnt how to 
improve value creation over the decade through the use of different distribution 
channels. 
 
Table 1: Sales of Champagne by volume from 1997 to 2003 
Sales in million 
bottles  (75cl)  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
In France   165 (61%)  179 (61%)  190 (58%)  149 (59%)  165 (63%)  175 (61%)  174 (59%) 
Outside France  103 (39%)  113 (39%)  137 (42%)  104 (41%)  98 (37%)  113 (39%)  119 (41%) 
Total annual 
sales  269  292 327 253 263 288 293 
Growth rate of 
sales by volume  + 5.2%  + 8.5%  + 12.0%  - 22.6%  + 3.9%  + 9.5%  + 1.9% 
 
 
Table 2: Sales of Champagne by value from 1997 to 2003 
Sales in billion 
euros  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003 
In France   1.51 (59%)  1.64 (55%) 1.91 (52%) 1.52 (51%) 1.64 (55%) 1.75 (53%)  1.80 (53%) 
Outside France  1.04 (41%)  1.31 (45%) 1.76 (48%) 1.45 (49%) 1.33 (45%) 1.54 (47%)  1.60 (47%) 
Total annual 
sales  2.55 2.95 3.67 2.97 2.97 3.29  3.4 
Growth rate of 





The objectives of the paper are: 
 
1.  To identify the types of distribution strategy implemented by Champagne 
makers 
2.  To measure the economic and financial performance of Champagne makers 
from 1992 to 2001 for each type of distribution Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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3.  To relate performance indicators to strategic decisions with respect to 
distribution channels 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, a review of literature looks co-
ordination and market power issues in food chains, it is mainly focused on 
producer-retailer relationships. Second, the methodology and data are discussed. 
Third, empirical findings about the Champagne industry are presented to shed 
light on the processor and retailer system. Finally, conclusions are drawn and the 
prospects for future development are examined. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
While Williams (1973) points out the generalized notion of a vertical coordination 
continuum, the literature about the industrial organization has evolved towards 
new institutional economics (Ménard & Shirley, 2005a), incorporating transaction 
costs and institutional environment as key elements in the organization of 
vertical systems. Looking at transaction inefficiency factors promoting vertical 
integration in food industries, Bhuyan (2005) finds that major reasons are 
diseconomies of scale and the fewness of sellers/buyers and finally demand 
uncertainty. 
 
Robicheaux and Coleman (1994) adapted the structure-conduct-performance 
model and focused on a behavioral approach to investigate buyer-supplier 
relationships.  
 
More focused on agri-food chain management, Trienekens and Zuurbier (1996) 
and Omta, Trienekens and Beers (1998) and the Dutch school observe increasing 
co-ordination – particularly about information exchange and logistics - in chains 
and networks. So, supply chains firms can work more efficiently to serve 
consumers. 
 
On another side, Malassis (1973), creating the French school of “filières”, 
emphasizes on power as a key driver of leadership and management of the 
agriculture and food business systems. Furthermore, Perez (2003), and Coelho 
and Rastoin (2004) highlight the changing role of corporate governance in public 
companies whose shareholders focus more on financial profitability than on 
industrial strategy.. 
 
Weiss (1989) stresses a market power hypothesis in food retailing since price is 
positively related to more concentrated market structure in many local market 
industries including food retailing due to local tight oligopolies. High profit may 
be due to lower costs or the offer of more expensive, higher quality, differentiated 
products (Demsetz, 1973). Following Cotteril (1986) and Nelson, Siegfried, and 
Howell (1992) observe that services, including breadth of product line and express Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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lane, are a major way for differentiation. But Cotteril (1999) finds that market 
share and concentration are not no significantly related to services and that most 
cost savings in large superstores are offset by pricing power liked to increased 
services levels. So, he rejects the Demsetz critique.  
 
Further, Rogers (2001) observe that concentration has advanced in almost every 
US food manufacturing industry, including the wine and brandy industry, over 
the 1958-1997 period and farmers remain outspoken that something are injured 
by the reduced number of buyers Cotteril (2001) develops a structural model of 
price transmission in a channel that has differentiates product oligopolies at two 
stages: retailer oligopoly and manufacturer oligopsony power. According to 
different market power level, the distribution of welfare may vary a lot among 
farmers, marketers, and consumers. The rise in US and European retail buyer 
concentration induced the development of private labels. There exist also private 
labels in the Champagne business. 
 
Champagne is produced in a restricted designated area of origin (appellation 
d’origine contrôlée - AOC, in French) to the east of Paris, France, but it is 
consumed around the world. About 65% of all Champagne bottled is drunk in 
France, the other 35% being consumed in other countries, mainly the UK, the 
USA, Germany, and Italy (CIVC, 2002).  
 
As in every industry, the business carried out by “Maisons de Champagne” is 
constrained by consumer demand. But it also has to respect legal restrictions on 
production both in terms of quantity (grapes must come from a limited designated 
area of origin, and there is a maximum authorized yield) and quality (specified 
varieties of vines must be used, manual harvest only, etc). However, there is still 
an uncertainty factor because of weather fluctuations from year to year, which 
cause fluctuation in grape production levels. On the demand side, shipments of 
bottles from processors to retailers vary from year to year because of swings in 
economic growth in the developed countries (CIVC, 1992 - 2001). 
 
Gaucher, Hovelaque and Soler (2000) have formulated the optimal procurement 
and inventory policies and calculated chain profits according to various levels of 
coordination between two producing firms. Gaucher, Soler and Tanguy (2002) 
studied quality incentives and supply contracts in the wine chains. Soler and 
Tanguy (2002) and Saulpic and Tanguy (2002) found that attracting equity 
capital from investors on stock exchanges is the Champagne makers’ best 
financial strategy for expansion. Giraud-Héraud, Mathurin and Soler (2003) have 
analyzed the legitimacy of supply regulation mechanisms for products protected 
by a designation of origin. They argue that such mechanisms reduce uncertainty, 
thus encouraging investment in quality improvement. 
 
Declerck & Pichot (1994) note that since it takes 3 years to turn grapes into 
Champagne, the adjustments of supply to demand lead to jumps in retail prices in Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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economic booms and drops in retail prices in periods of stagnation/recession. This 
phenomenon disconcerts consumers and seriously affects vine growers and wine 
makers. Declerck (1996) shows that high value added to sales and low financial 
leverage are good indicators to explain operational and financial performance in 
the Champagne industry. Declerck (2004) reports that vine growers and wine 
makers have learned from experience and are able to negotiate terms with 
retailers to limit price swings. A producer – retailer cycle is exhibited with 3 loops 
over the period 1978-2002. 
 




Porter’s model (1985) is used for strategic purposes, leading to definition of a 
typology of Champagne makers according to their distribution channel: 
 
•  Supermarket operators 
•  Specialized distributors like wine stores, cafes, hotels, restaurants, etc. 
•  Global distribution networks, i.e. combining on-trade and off-trade outlets, 
worldwide. The characteristics of each distribution channel are studied, 
particularly barriers to entry - which may be quite considerable - and 
access to consumers.  
 
According to their distribution channels, Champagne makers have different 
characteristics that can be observed through: 
 
1.  Measures of financial structure:  
•  Equity capital to total assets 
•  Equity capital to long-term capital 
•  Financial leverage, measured as the financial debt to equity  
 
2.  Economic performance indicators:  
•  Sales growth in 2001 compared to 2000 
•  Value added, i.e. the wealth created by labor and capital, measured 
by the difference between production and consumption of raw 
materials and external services 
•  Labor costs 
•  Earnings before interest, taxation, depreciation & amortization 
(EBITDA) 
•  Operating margin 
 
3. Financial  measures of performance: 
•  Profit margin 
•  Return on equity (ROE) Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 




Secondary data used to measure the economic and financial criteria of 
Champagne makers come from financial data banks and cover a ten-year-period 
(1992–2001). They are used to compute financial ratios in order to grasp the 
financial situation of corporations. 
 
Data come from the Champagne wine interprofession committee - Comité 
Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne (CIVC), Nielsen and Banque de France, 
the websites of the Union of Champagne makers (Union des Maisons de 
Champagne) and the annual reports released by some “Maisons”. 
 
The paper also uses analysis of financial data available in the “DIANE” data bank 
from Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing for 20 Maisons de Champagne over 
the period 1992-2001. The 20 Champagne makers in the sample are Besserat de 
Bellefon, Bollinger, Canard-Duchêne, De Castellane, De Cazanove, Duval-Leroy, 
Krug, Lanson, Laurent-Perrier, Marne et Champagne, Mercier, Moët & Chandon, 
G.H. Mumm, Piper Heidsieck, Pommery, Louis-Roederer, Ruinart, Taittinger, 
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin and Vranken. Data after 2001 were not available for all 
20 companies, and in order to compare the Maisons de Champagne on the same 




The major difficulties for this financial analysis lay in the following: 
 
•  The presentation of accounting documents: the wording used in the 
accounts may be too vague to grasp the precise meaning, for instance in one 
case when “other assets” amounted to 30% of total assets 
•  Accounting years of different length 
•  Non-availability of data for some years 
•  Exceptional events like divestitures, mergers or acquisitions that may 
affect the interpretation of figures 
 
In order to avoid misinterpretation in analysis, some checking of sources of these 




Structure of Champagne Brands on the French Market: Branded Products and 
Private Labels 
 
The French market absorbs about two thirds of Champagne sales. In 2002 in 
French super and hypermarkets, 14 brands of Champagne held 19% of the Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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market. This concentration ratio is low with respect to the 40% threshold for a 
top-4-firm concentration ratio considered by most authors the limit for perfect 
competition in food industries (Declerck & Scherrick, 1993). The Champagne 
market is thus highly fragmented and competition is very fierce. 
 
In French modern retailing in 2002, according to AC Nielsen data (Laboissière, 
2003) about one out of four bottles of Champagne was sold under a private label. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that the market share of private labels in France increased 
by 23.6% in volume and 19% in value in 2002, and this penetration is slowly 
increasing. The market shares of private labels for other sparkling wines, rum, 
spirits and wine-based aperitifs are lower, but register more significant growth 
than private label Champagnes. Private label penetration is greater for red AOC 
Bordeaux and red AOC Côtes du Rhône wines. Over the 25 years from 1978 to 
2003, vine growers and wine makers were able to expand and double sales from 
about 150 million to 300 million bottles. 
 
Table 3: Volume Market Share of Branded Products and Private Labels for 
Selected Alcoholic Beverages at French Modern Retailers 
Alcoholic beverages 
Market share of branded 
products 
Market share of private 
labels 
Champagne*  76.6 % (+ 5 %)  23.6 % (+ 6.4 %) 
Rum**  80% (+ 1.3 %)  20 % (+ 8.2 %) 
Vodka**  87 % (+ 5%)  11 % (+ 10 %) 
Gin**  84 % (- 3.1%)  16 % (+ 9.7 %) 
Tequila**  86 % (- 7.7%)  14 % (+ 50.7 %) 
* Source: Laboissière, 2003  
** Source: Laboissière, 2004 
 
 
Table 4: Value Market Share of Private Labels for Selected Alcoholic Beverages at 
French Modern Retailers 
  Market share of private labels in 2002
Champagne 19% 
Other sparkling wines  13% 
Whisky 9% 
Wine-based aperitifs   9% 
Red Bordeaux (claret) AOC wine  37% 
Red Côtes du Rhône AOC wine  23% 
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Competitive Environment of Champagne Makers by Type of Distribution Channel 
 
The principal features of the champagne market include barriers to entry, 
technological and storage constraints and the question of access to consumers 
(due to the product’s alcohol content). All these must be taken into account in 
producers’ and retailers’ expectations of risks and price. 
 
The Champagne industry has specific technological and storage constraints. The 
time necessary to produce Champagne is a crucial constraint: the process takes 
about 3 years, from the grape harvest to the sale of the bottle. Consequently, large 
stocks of bottles aging in cellars must be financed. 
 
The legal constraints affecting production are those applicable for a designated 
area of origin: 
 
•  Strictly defined production area, encompassing 35,155 hectares east of 
Paris 
•  Maximum yield limit on grapes 
•  Compliance with strictly applied rules (type and quantity of grapes, 
environmental conditions, specific processing requirements, etc) 
 
Most of the designated area of origin is already planted with vines, and only a few 
hundred additional hectares are potentially available. If totally covered by vines, 
the vineyards of Champagne, which can currently produce about 320 million 
bottles, could reach production of 340 / 360 million bottles. But no further 
expansion would be possible. 
 
On the sales side, legal constraints differ from one country to another. Many 
countries have restrictions on communication and advertising on wine. France 
does not easily grant authorization for supermarkets and hypermarkets larger 
than 300 m2. Most countries outside Europe limit or prohibit the sales of wines 
and spirits in food stores. Most alcoholic beverages are sold at specialist wine 
merchants and liquor stores. Taxation of alcoholic beverages is also specific to 
each country. 
 
Figure 1 shows the competitive forces that determine the Champagne industry’s 
profitability. Champagne wine makers are under pressure from both: 
 
•  Their suppliers, i.e. vine growers and co-operatives of vine growers 
•  Their major clients: on the French market, which accounts for 2/3 of sales, 
6 purchasing centers (belonging to supermarket and hypermarket 
operators) buy and distribute 46 million bottles of the total 93 millions 
bottles sold by “Maisons de Champagne” in France, i.e. about 50% of 
production 
 Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Threat of potential entrants Legal protections and constraints
Potential Entrants Legislation
. High barrier to entry due to high volumes . Legislation on designated areas of origin (AOC) to protect
demanded by hyper and supermarkets the "Champagne" name, limiting surfaces and yields
. High barrier to entry due to the supply of . Laws (e.g. Evin law in France) limiting communication 
grapes of particular vintages to be blended in and advertisements on alcoholic beverages
order to guarantee quality over large volumes . Laws (e.g. Raffarin law in France) limiting  the opening up
. High barrier to entry due to the cost of an Industry competitors =  of supermarkets and hypemarkets larger than 300 m
2
international commercial & logistical network Maisons de Champagne
Characteristics: Bargaining power of buyers
Bargaining power of suppliers . Strong competition between Buyers = supermarkets, cafes, restaurants, wine stores
Suppliers = vine growers merchants and co-ops Super & hypermarket operators and hotel-restaurant chains:
. Strong bargaining power since suppliers . Operators fragmented  - have strong bargaining power in France and Western
may make wine with a co-op and there is : between merchants and  Europe where they are highly concentrated.
. No substitute for "AOC Champagne" grapes wine-making co-ops - have the power to delist and reject large volumes of wine from
. Limited area of "Champagne" vineyards . Lack of brand homogeneity  store shelves, so Champagne makers may be in financial danger.
. Limited grape yield across countries
Independent wine stores and cafes worldwide:
Threat of Substitute Products or Services Performance drivers Low bargaining power because they are not highly concentrated
Substitutes . Brand awareness Large sales force is required to reach large numbers of individual clients
. Other sparkling wines . Volumes of wine from the
. Other wines same blend of grapes in Bargaining power of final buyers
. Spirits: whisky, rhum, Cognac, order to ensure constant taste Final clients = consumers
  vodka, gin, etc Households and business men / women have no bargaining power.









Figure 1: Competitive Forces that Determine the Champagne Industry's ProfitabilityDeclerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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The bargaining power depends on the type of distribution channel: 
 
•  There are specific barriers to entry for French modern retailers, in the form 
of :  
-  The high volumes demanded by the six major hyper and 
supermarket operators: Auchan, Carrefour, Casino, Cora, 
Intermarché, Lucie (Leclerc–Système U) 
-  The strict requirement for grapes of particular vintages to be 
blended in order to guarantee constant quality over large volumes 
 
•  Barriers to entry may be similar for distribution through international 
chains of hotels and restaurants. But most on-trade cafes, hotels, 
restaurants, liquor services and nightclubs are independent and have low 
bargaining power. Champagne makers may therefore attain a stronger 
position in selling through the on-trade channel of distribution, which is 
not highly concentrated. However, reaching such individual clients in niche 
markets requires an extensive network of commercial agents and a low-cost 
logistical network.  
 
•  In many countries outside Western Europe, wine cannot be sold in 
supermarkets. Consequently, Champagne makers with international sales 




Price by Type of Distribution Channel 
 
The Maisons de Champagne sell bottles under their own brand of the same name. 
Some Champagne makers sell mainly to modern retailers in France or Europe, 
while others sell mainly to the on-trade distribution channel. Some of them have 
a worldwide distribution network. 
 
A typology of 20 Champagne makers is drawn up according to the distribution 
network used in France (see table 5). The breakdown of the sample is as follows: 
 
•  Seven Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern retailers 
(Canard-Duchêne, De Castellane, De Cazanove, Duval-Leroy, Marne & 
Champagne, Mercier and Vranken) 
•  Six Champagne makers with mainly on-trade distribution selling through 
liquor services, cafes, hotels, restaurants and night-clubs (Besserat de 
Bellefon, Bollinger, Krug, Laurent-Perrier, Louis-Roederer and Ruinart) 
•  Seven Champagne makers with a global distribution network (Lanson, 
Moët & Chandon, Mumm, Piper Heidsieck, Pommery, Taittinger and 
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin) 
 Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Observations show that: 
 
•  The lowest prices for branded products are observed for brands mainly sold 
in super and hypermarkets. Prices range from 15 € to 25 € (excluding VAT) 
in France. It should be noted that these Maisons also sell bottles to modern 
retailers under private labels at cheaper prices, between 10 and 15 € a 
bottle in general.  
•  Intermediate prices apply for Champagne makers selling mainly to liquor 
services, cafes, hotels, restaurants and nightclubs.  
•  The highest prices are achieved by the Maisons with a global international 
network of sales outlets. 
 
Table 5: Typology of 20 Champagne Brands by Price and Distribution Network in 
France 
Retail price of 













Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin 
Moët & Chandon 
Taittinger 
 














Besserat de Bellefon 
 








Figure 2 shows that prices outside France are higher than prices in France, where 
competition is tougher due to: 
 
•  Competition from co-operatives of vine growers which process Champagne 
for their members or for themselves and mainly serve the French market 
•  The high sales levels concentrated in the six purchasing centers owned by 
the big French modern retailers 
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Price per bottle outside France
Average price per bottle weigthed by sales
Price per bottle in France
 
 






Table 6 relates the financial performance of Champagne makers to their main 
type of distribution channel used in 2001.  
 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show details of financial results for every Champagne maker in 
the sample. Table 7 presents the financial results of Champagne makers selling 
mainly to modern retailers. Table 8 documents the financial performance of 
Champagne makers selling mainly to wine specialists, cafes, hotels, and 
restaurants. Table 9 presents the financial comparison of Champagne makers 
with global distribution channels, i.e. selling both on-trade and off-trade 
worldwide. 
 
The financial performance of Champagne makers is analyzed with reference to 
three complementary aspects: 
 
•  Equilibrium of the financial structure 
•  Economic and operating profitability 
•  Financial profitability 
 
Mean and median values are provided. Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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Table 6: Financial Comparison of Champagne Makers per type of Distribution Channel in 2001 
MEAN VALUES MEDIAN VALUES















Vineyard ownership in hectare 82 75 137 18 45 270
Key Results
Total Sales in k€ 67 056 48 180 179 478 55 690 38 896 94 300
Operating Income in k€ 6 435 12 334 41 423 5 178 9 917 10 372
Net Income in k€ 1 393 8 367 30 108 1 151 5 270 14 892
Financial Structure
Equity Capital / Total Assets 29% 55% 50% 27% 50% 54%
Equity Capital / Long Term Capital 37% 62% 55% 28% 59% 64%
Financial Debt / Equity Shareholder's Funds 272% 62% 74% 218% 65% 42%
Economic Performance
Sales Growth in 2001 w.r.t. 2000 17,4% -1,3% -7,9% 24,0% 2,2% -9,0%
Value Added to Sales 16,3% 41,7% 37,3% 17,9% 44,8% 34,7%
Labor Costs to Value Added 31,8% 31,9% 41,9% 31,4% 33,2% 45,0%
Financial Expenses to Value Added 37,5% 23,9% 20,9% 38,3% 20,0% 20,0%
EBITDA to Total Assets 6,1% 10,9% 8,7% 4,6% 12,9% 6,5%
EBITDA to Sales 9,4% 27,3% 19,7% 9,4% 28,2% 16,8%
Operating margin = EBIT to Sales 9,6% 23,0% 23,1% 9,6% 19,6% 12,7%
Financial Profitability
Profit margin on Sales 2,1% 17,7% 16,8% 2,1% 15,3% 17,8%
Return on equity (ROE) 1,7% 11,6% 11,0% 4,6% 13,2% 9,6%
Growth rate over the period 1997-2001
Growth rate of sales -2% 13% 9% -2% 16% 19%
Growth rate of EBIT -9% 82% 775% -25% 28% 66%
Growth rate of Net Income -76% 716% 246% -78% 72% 90%
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Table 7: Comparison of Champagne makers selling mainly to modern retailers in 2001 











Vineyard ownership in hectare 18 0 0 150 0 231 175 82 18
Key Results
Total Sales in k€ 53 989 24 903 42 408 55 755 129 880 55 690 106 769 67 056 55690
Operating Income in k€ 5 178 1 530 1 698 3 129 13 321 6 247 13 940 6 435 5178
Net Income in k€ 3 295 -3 011 223 1 151 -829 5 868 3 054 1 393 1151
Financial Structure
Equity Capital / Total Assets 30,1% 26,7% 27,9% 21,5% 10,7% 72,1% 11,7% 28,7% 26,7%
Equity Capital / Long Term Capital 55,0% 27,9% 34,4% 25,6% 10,9% 85,0% 17,2% 36,6% 27,9%
Financial Debt / Equity Shareholder's 
Funds 45,7% 217,9% 168,5% 263,2% 660,3% 1,6% 548,0% 272,2% 217,9%
Economic Performance
Sales Growth in 2001 w.r.t. 2000 35% -33% 58% 29% 24% 6% 3% 17,4% 24,0%
Value Added to Sales 12,4% 19,3% 10,1% 17,9% 20,0% 14,1% 20,2% 16,3% 17,9%
Labor Costs to Value Added 16% 56% 41% 48% 31% 9% 21% 31,8% 31,4%
Financial Expenses to Value Added 40% 31% 38% 33% 62% 8% 50% 37,5% 38,3%
EBITDA to Total Assets 12,3% 3,3% 4,6% 4,5% 4,0% 7,2% 6,9% 6,1% 4,6%
EBITDA to Sales 9,4% 6,3% 4,9% 7,8% 11,5% 11,9% 13,9% 9,4% 9,4%
Operating margin = EBIT to Sales 9,6% 6,1% 4,0% 6,2% 10,3% 11,2% 13,1% 9,6% 9,6%
Profitability
Profit margin on Sales 6,1% -12,1% 0,5% 2,1% -0,6% 10,5% 2,9% 2,1% 2,1%
Return on equity (ROE) 14,6% -22,5% 1,5% 4,6% -2,0% 7,6% 8,3% 1,7% 4,6%
Growth rate over the period 1997-2001
Growth rate of sales 12% -45% 72% -2% -18% -33% 3% -2% -2%
Growth rate of EBIT -25% -39% 86% -51% -14% -44% 26% -9% -25%
Growth rate of Net Income -40% -221% -85% -78% -126% 16% 5% -76% -78%
For Marne & Champagne, the accounting year 1997 lasts 14 months. 
So, it is difficult to analyse the growth rate over the period 1997-2001 for Marne & Champagne.  
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Table 8: Comparison of Champagne Makers Selling Mostly to Wine Specialists, Cafes, Hotels and  
Restaurants in 2001 













Vineyard ownership in hectare 10 153 19 70 200 0 75 44,5
Key Results
Total Sales in k€ 14 844 38 138 15 892 112 965 67 586 39 654 48 180 38 896
Operating Income in k€ 1 261 12 457 3 151 21 953 27 803 7 377 12 334 9 917
Net Income in k€ 3 413 6 924 1 987 11 739 22 525 3 616 8 367 5 270
Financial Structure
Equity Capital / Total Assets 40,6% 59,3% 68,1% 39,2% 88,0% 36,0% 55,2% 49,9%
Equity Capital / Long Term Capital 49,2% 67,3% 72,8% 43,2% 88,9% 50,0% 61,9% 58,7%
Financial Debt / Equity Shareholder's 
Funds 102,6% 41,8% 25,7% 108,8% 4,1% 88,0% 61,8% 64,9%
Economic Performance
Sales Growth in 2001 w.r.t. 2000 8% 17% -29% -8% 5% -1% -1,3% 2,2%
Value Added to Sales 16,5% 55,4% 55,0% 34,6% 55,1% 33,7% 41,7% 44,8%
Labor Costs to Value Added 34% 32% 39% 25% 23% 38% 31,9% 33,2%
Financial Expenses to Value Added 55% 8% 36% 14% 5% 26% 23,9% 20,0%
EBITDA to Total Assets 2,8% 17,7% 5,9% 13,5% 12,7% 13,1% 10,9% 12,9%
EBITDA to Sales 8,8% 36,1% 31,6% 24,7% 42,4% 20,3% 27,3% 28,2%
Operating margin = EBIT to Sales 8,5% 32,7% 19,8% 19,4% 41,1% 16,6% 23,0% 19,6%
Profitability
Profit margin on Sales 23,0% 18,2% 12,5% 10,4% 33,3% 9,1% 17,7% 15,3%
Return on equity (ROE) 15,1% 13,2% 3,2% 13,1% 11,2% 13,8% 11,6% 13,2%
Growth rate over the period 1997-2001
Growth rate of sales -22% 50% -3% 15% 23% 16% 13% 15%
Growth rate of EBIT 94% 99% 10% 245% 28% 18% 82% 61%
Growth rate of Net Income 3997% 92% 82% 72% 58% -3% 716% 77%
For Besserat de Bellefon, the accounting year 1997 lasts 14 months. So, its growth rate over the period 1997-2001 cannot be analysed  
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Table 9: Comparison of Champagne Makers Selling Both On-trade and Off-trade Worldwide in 2001 















Vineyard ownership in hectare 0 > 760 275 50 470 (*) 270 363 137 270
Key Results
Total Sales in k€ 81 465 551 526 86 905 127 739 94 300 77 997 236 412 179 478 94 300
Operating Income in k€ 10 372 161 788 9 753 9 119 7 550 13 562 77 819 41 423 10 372
Net Income in k€ 973 98 062 30 182 3 471 4 147 14 892 59 029 30 108 14 892
Financial Structure
Equity Capital / Total Assets 26,0% 52,0% 54,0% 31,0% 66,0% 66,0% 55,0% 50,0% 54,0%
Equity Capital / Long Term Capital 33,0% 57,0% 66,0% 35,0% 64,0% 67,0% 64,0% 55,1% 64,0%
Financial Debt / Equity Shareholder's 
Funds 193,0% 46,0% 21,0% 161,0% 30,0% 26,0% 42,0% 74,1% 42,0%
Economic Performance
Sales Growth in 2001 w.r.t. 2000 13% -13% -22% -18% -7% 1% -9% -7,9% -9,0%
Value Added to Sales 31,3% 46,5% 30,5% 23,7% 34,7% 46,2% 48,5% 37,3% 34,7%
Labor Costs to Value Added 36% 28% 47% 45% 64% 49% 24% 41,9% 45,0%
Financial Expenses to Value Added 36% 23% 12% 20% 17% 6% 32% 20,9% 20,0%
EBITDA to Total Assets 6,3% 15,5% 6,5% 5,7% 3,1% 6,9% 16,8% 8,7% 6,5%
EBITDA to Sales 16,8% 31,4% 13,0% 11,3% 9,5% 20,6% 35,3% 19,7% 16,8%
Operating margin = EBIT to Sales 12,7% 29,3% 11,2% 7,1% 8,0% 17,4% 32,9% 23,1% 12,7%
Financial Profitability
Profit margin on Sales 1,2% 17,8% 34,7% 2,7% 4,4% 19,1% 25,0% 16,8% 17,8%
Return on equity (ROE) 1,4% 15,5% 25,9% 3,9% 2,2% 9,6% 18,5% 11,0% 9,6%
Growth rate over the period 1997-2001
Growth rate of sales -35% 21% -24% 45% 1% 19% 36% 9% 19%
Growth rate of EBIT 31% 26% 176% 2028% 3061% 37% 66% 775% 66%
Growth rate of Net Income 90% 7% 1316% 197% -24% 103% 33% 246% 90%
(*) When Pommery was sold to Vraken group in April 2002, 450 ha out of 470 ha were kept by LVMH for Moët & Chandon mainly.  
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In terms of corporate sales, the total sales of Champagne makers with global 
distribution networks were the highest, with a median value of 94.3 million € for 
the sample in 2001. Sales of Champagne makers distributing mainly to French 
modern retailers follow, at 55.7 million €. Sales of Champagne makers selling 
mainly through on-trade distribution outlets are lower, at 38.9 million €. 
 
The financial structure of Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern 
retailers is very weak. These companies have a very high level of financial debt, 
standing at about 201 to 270% of equity. Champagne makers with mainly on-
trade distribution and Champagne makers with global distribution have good 
financial structure, with debt at about 65% and 42 to 74% respectively. The other 
financial structure ratios confirm these results. 
 
Based on median value, Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern 
retailers have the lowest vineyard ownership (18 ha) compared to other 
Champagne makers (45 ha for Champagne makers with mainly on-trade 
distribution and 270 ha for Champagne makers with global distribution).  
 
EBITDA is a measure of wealth created by the operational activity of the 
company, independently of the company’s financing, depreciation, amortization 
and tax policy. The economic profitability, measured by EBITDA to sales, is about 
27% to 28% for Champagne makers with mainly on-trade distribution, which 
register the best performance. Champagne makers with global distribution follow 
with about 17% to 19%, which is still a good result. But with EBITDA of about 
9.6%, Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern retailers turn in a 
poor performance.  
 
The results are similar for the value added to sales ratio. Value added is the 
wealth created by human and financial capital. It is the difference between total 
sales and external operating charges. Since labor costs are internal charges, they 
are not included in those external operating charges. Financial expenses as a 
percentage of value added are comparatively higher for Champagne makers 
selling mainly to French modern retailers. This result is consistent with the fact 
that their debt level is the highest. But the highest proportions of labor costs are 
found at Champagne makers with global distribution networks, possibly because 
big international firms have to pay more business executives.  
 
The operating margin expressed as the ratio of EBIT to total sales, is about 19.6% 
on average with a median value of 23% for Champagne makers with mainly on-
trade distribution. Champagne makers with global distribution networks have 
the same mean value but a lower median value, 12.7%. These results are 
excellent compared to financial results generally in the food and agribusiness 
sector. However, Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern retailers 
exhibit an average ratio lower than 10%. Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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The financial profitability ratios show that Champagne makers with mainly on-
trade distribution and Champagne makers using global distribution are quite 
similar: 
 
•  Their profit margin on sales is about 15% to 17% 
•  Their return on equity is about 10% to 13% 
 
These results are very good: two thirds of annual Champagne sales usually take 
place during the last four months of the year. This means that most sales took 
place during the economic stagnation/depression after the attacks in New York on 
September 11, 2001. 
 
However, Champagne makers selling mainly to French modern retailers exhibit 
very low ratios: 
 
•  Their profit margin on sales is about 2% 
•  Their return on equity is lower than 5% 
 
Clearly, the economic, operating and financial profits depend on the distribution 
network and the sales price. Champagne makers selling wine to supermarket and 
hypermarket chains showed very low profitability. Champagne makers selling 
through the on-trade distribution channel and worldwide networks were very 
profitable in 2001. Similar patterns are observed in analyzing financial reports 
from various years. 
 
Furthermore, from 1997 to 2001, Champagne makers selling mainly to 
supermarkets registered negative growth rates for sales, EBITDA and net 
income. They were unable to keep up the momentum from the sales boom of 1999. 
 
Champagne makers with mainly on-trade distribution, meanwhile, enjoyed very 
positive growth rates in business volumes and profitability, and Champagne 
makers with global distribution networks grew even faster. They were able to 
take advantage of the new millennium and also to maintain that advantage over 
the following years.  
 
The financial details provided in tables 7, 8 and 9 show that the family-owned 
traditional Champagne makers Bollinger and Louis-Roederer, which only sell 
through the international on-trade channels of distribution, achieve the best 
results. They are just ahead of Champagne makers with global distribution like 
Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin (LVMH group), Moët & Chandon (LVMH group) and 
Taittinger, which also had excellent results.  
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Conclusions 
 
The findings are not surprising. On one side, the largest Champagne makers are 
mass producers with economy of scale and cost leadership advantages. So, they 
can market successfully worldwide both in supermarkets. On another side, high 
quality Champagne producers rely on their brand equity and are able to sell at a 
higher price through a network of wine stores, i.e. specialized retailers. When 
they try to sell through supermarkets selling at discount prices, they are not 
powerful enough and must accept lower prices in order to be listed. And they fail. 
Champagne makers have poor financial results when they only face the market 
power of the six major French supermarket operators. 
 
Champagne makers with mainly on-trade distribution and Champagne makers 
with global distribution worldwide have learnt how to improve value creation 
over the decade, and took full advantage of the new millennium. They also 
achieved excellent financial results. However, Champagne makers selling 
mainly to supermarkets registered poor financial results. 
 
The results explain why most Champagne makers are trying to increase their 
non-supermarket sales, in order to achieve better prices and profitability. But 
such a strategy requires the financial means to develop brand awareness and an 
international distribution channel.  
 
Most of the Champagne makers selling mainly to supermarket operators face 
high financial debt and cannot afford such an investment. They can only access 
international sales through partnership with other wine and spirits distributors, 
as Piper Heidsieck did when its parent wine and spirit company, Remy-Cointreau 
(France), decided to share its distribution network with Jeam Beam Brands 
Worldwide (USA), Highland Distillers Ltd (UK) and later Vins & Sprit A.B. 
(Sweden). 
 
Processors take advantage of branding and economy of scale in production. They 
adjust their production strategy in taking distributors’ marketing power into 
account. 
 
The paper shows that Champagne makers need a second quality product, like 
good sparkling wine, that can be processed at lower cost and sold at large scale 
through supermarkets. They usually use a brand name related to their 
Champagne brand name. Such a strategy is already undertaken: Moët & 
Chandon produces sparkling wine under the brand “Domaine Chandon” in 
California and Australia. Champagne Mumm also produces sparkling wine in 
California, “Mumm Napa”. Sparkling wines are sold at lower price. 
 
Such a strategy is also implemented by other food processors. For example: Declerck / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 8, Issue 4, 2005 
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•  French producers of goose liver (foie gras) also sell cheaper products like 
mousse of goose liver under their brand 
•  In the European cheese sector, processors sell “gourmet” cheese like 
“Roquefort” in shops specialized on delicatessen while they enjoy large 
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